‘Not Doklam alone. China may make moves in Arunachal and Andamans’

SN: What would such a deal look like? 

JR: The first basis is that it has to be a mutual withdrawal at the same time - - simultaneous by both sides. That is one way in which both will not lose face. 

This will have to be achieved through quiet negotiations where the two sides can talk about going back to a particular date -- that is one area of quibble the two can have. 

But while doing this they will also have to deal with the issue of the legal right over Doklam. Both sides can say that we understand that we are causing a lot of disturbance to Bhutan, and in the interests of Bhutan we will withdraw. 

But the key will be simultanous withdrawal and leaving the status of Doklam unresolved. 

SN: India'ss External Affairs Minister did speak of force withdrawal by both sides. But it evoked really angry response from the Chinese. 

JR: Throughout this stand-off the Chinese have insisted that Doklam is their territory. They have not agreed to even any suggestion that it is disputed. 

They say India has intruded into Chinese territory ostensibly to help the Bhutanese, and they claim that we pressured Bhutan. 

Third, the Chinese diplomats are going around saying that India carried out a surgical strike against China, like we did in Pakistan or Myanmar. 

They insist it is Chinese territory. So it will remain a sticking point and that is why they reacted. They do not like being told that the basis for their claim is unfounded. 

SN: Why are established mechanisms like the 2012 agreement regarding trilateral junctions or the special representatives on border talks not been working in this situation? Do you see any progress when National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval goes to Beijing for the BRICS NSA forum? 

JR: The Chinese decided to violate the agreement and that is the simple reason why it is not working. 

This particular road-building has been going on since 2003. It is another matter they were never stopped effectively.

In 2012, the issue did come up and there was an agreement that the Chinese will not build that road. They have gone back on it. There is nothing we could do. 

It affected Bhutan, and because of our special relationship we stepped in. But it also affected our strategic interests: not only does our (Chicken Neck or Siliguri)  corridor become more vulnerable, our troops on the other side also become vulnerable because Doklam is on higher ground.

Third, if they build the road to Gymochen -- their position is that Gymochen is the tri-junction and watershed -- and they want to draw the line from there eastwards, thereby staking their claims on Arunachal. We would not want them to do that. 

As for NSA Ajit Doval's trip, it is like any other NSA of a BRICS country going and so far there is no indication of a one-on-one or a pull aside happening. I don't know if he will raise the issue first, but he will certainly go prepared. 

I don't see that India is hesitant or shy of making a proposal and letting its people know that it has made a proposal in the interest of seeking peace. That, of course, does not mean that there is going to be a pull-back. 

SN: Militarily speaking where does India stand in the Doklam situation? Some analysts have pointed out how Indian forces have an advantage. 

JR: It would be unwise for us to focus on Doklam because that is not where I expect any action. Today, we are in a solid position in Doklam. We are at a height, our troops are well positioned, logistic supply lines are good. 

The Chinese lack all three. They have certainly brought additional troops but they will have to funnel in more which automatically creates difficulties. They have a limited number there who are exposed. The local commander would just not want to sacrifice his troops like that. 

For that reason, I  would not look at Doklam alone as an area of conflict. I think if the Chinese do something, it would be elsewhere. 

SN: Elsewhere would be? 

JR: Along Arunachal Pradesh may be, or the Andamans. Arunachal is perhaps weaker than Ladakh etc. (If there are) some points they feel are not well-protected, they may try (to come in) there. 

At certain places (on that border) we also have a problem of reaching the spot because our troops would have to move up. And if they (Chinese) really want to ramp up the conflict then Andamans is an easy target. We are not that strongly deployed there. 

However, we should be able to spot them if they are moving there, in which case our sailing out there would be much quicker. 

SN: Why can't the Bhutanese talk to China directly without India getting into the picture? 

JR: There is a disparity in the size of Bhutan and China. Bhutan does not have the resources of population or even military resources. It is in no position to challenge China. They have had 24 rounds of talks with the Chinese on the border issues and have made little progress. 

The apprehensions of the Bhutanese with the Chinese are also evident in the fact that they resisted allowing the Chinese to set-up an embassy in Thimpu, and establishing formal diplomatic relations. 

We have two friendship treaties with Bhutan. Way back, Pandit Nehru had said any attack on Bhutan is like aggression against India. It is not a question of Bhutan not negotiating directly with them. Bhutan has protested not just this time but in the past as well. But the Chinese ignored them. 

SN: How far is the internal politics of the Chinese Communist Party responsible for this tough stance? A Congress is forthcoming too. 

JR: On issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, ever since Xi Jinping was appointed the general secretary of the party, chairman of the military commission and the president of China, he has been very clear that there will be no compromise. 

He famously issued a directive called 'bottom-line thinking', which the PLA has also taken up saying there 'can be no concession on sovereignty and territory'. 

So this firmness or assertion is not new. This effort to start to rebuild the road is part of their plan to go up to Gymochen and pressure Bhutan. That is why the rhetoric that Doklam is Chinese territory. 

As far as the 19th Congress is concerned, he (Xi Jinping) has reached a stage where he cannot afford to appear weak or to back off. And there are already indicators of some sniping against him. 

There are some groups that are not happy with Xi Jinping and what he is doing. So he might have to make some compromises. But he is looking at the larger agenda of getting his people in the top slots. It (the Congress) narrows the window available to Xi Jinping to take action. 

But let us also look at it from another side.  Suppose he does have a showdown and China inflicts greater damage on us then that will give him a boost. He will be able to say that the military reforms that are being implemented have succeeded. 

Xi will also factor in that the last time this was tried was in 1979 with Vietnam when it was PLA, which walked away with a bloody nose. And on two occasions with us -- in 1967 and 1987 -- when there were showdowns we bested them. 

So it is not going to be an easy situation for him. The Chinese say their entire planning is for a short quick war with a decisive victory. That is not going to happen. It is going to be protracted. It is going to be bloody and there is going to be damage on both sides. 

China has Xi, India has another strongman in Modi, and they both have a vision where economic development is at the centre. So will they be willing to risk that? 

SN: What are Xi's immediate goals? 

JR: He holds more official positions than anybody else since Mao and has concentrated a lot of power. 

Second, in the last year it is noticeable that his thinking, speeches and writings are being put together and described as Xi Jinping Thought. There were only two leaders who have got that status so far i.e. Mao and Deng. In the pantheon of Chinese communists, he will rank Number three. 

Third, since 2013 his acolytes have been saying that China under Xi has embarked on a new 30-year era akin to those of Mao and Deng. He is obviously placing himself on that level. So it automatically implies he could intend to stay on for a while. 

Two things are important: one his China dream, which goes on till 2020, and second is OBOR (till 2045). 

Will he go on until then? Will the Party accept that, unless he becomes another Mao? His coming back at the forthcoming party Congress is assured. Internally, he has really tightened systems, and that is why on territory and sovereignty we see a hardening of the Chinese state since Xi came in. 

SN: Some Chinese papers wrote that China may intervene in Kashmir. 

JR: Whatever Global Times publishes is cleared from the top. They may exaggerate issues but they have put it out there. Their vice ministers have also made statements of how they are willing to mediate in case we both (India and Pakistan) want it. 

They have been talking to the United States on regional hot button issues. I suspect that there is convergence of interests between the Chinese and the Americans. And they are also closely tied with the Pakistanis. 

Two more things: Mirwaiz was invited by a Chinese NGO to Beijing in 2010. I have not been able to find that Chinese NGO. Syed Ali Shah Geelani spoke to a newspaper in May 2016, where he described China as a good friend and how it has a role in Kashmir. These two incidents make me feel that there is certainly a link, there must be some quiet linkages, that are in operation either through the Pakistanis or directly. 

SN: What does China aim to achieve through this standoff? 

JR: There are several objectives. The immediate ones include planning the operation for rebuilding the road. They want to take it to Gymochen and then say this is the watershed and reinforce their claim on Arunachal. 

Another objective is to get Bhutan to accept full diplomatic ties with China and allow them to establish their embassy. 

Larger objectives include making it clear to South Asian neighbours, particularly Nepal, that the Chinese are here in the neighbourhood and they have prevented India from gobbling up Bhutan. 

The larger message would also be that India, which has been getting closer to the US, has been sorted out by China and the Americans have not been able to come to its aid. 

And, to others in the region, that if you expect India to help in the South China Sea and so on, then you are barking up the wrong tree and you have to accept Chinese dominance. 

Edited by Joyjeet Das